Toleration
The problem and theory of toleration is rooted in the early modern recognition that pluralism is not temporary. In modern societies, people will have deep differences over the most important moral, political, social, and especially religious questions and values. Attempts to suppress these differences are disastrous: if they temporarily succeed, the result is tyranny, conspiracy, and the Inquisition; when they fail, the result is religious war. The idea of toleration, then, is the idea of leaving a space of accepted difference, for instance between Protestants and Catholics, while maintaining a shared core of belief or of moral and political practice. That is, toleration is the on-its-face paradoxical idea of choosing not to enforce some of what we think most important.
Within that broad idea, there are many particular theories of toleration, and many taxonomies have been developed to handle that range. Preston King, for instance, divides theories of toleration by their objects, and distinguishes between ideational, organisational and identity toleration 2 . Catriona McKinnon divides by justification, and distinguishes between theories grounded in scepticism, in value pluralism, and in the ideal of reasonableness 3 . Rainer Forst divides by the relation between tolerator and tolerated, and distinguishes between permission, coexistence, respect, and esteem 2 Preston King, Toleration (New York: St Martin's Press, 1976 Two examples will make the point of these questions clearer, as well as providing useful materials for my later argument. First, consider John Rawls's theory of toleration:
1. A shared core of belief and practice is justified by reasonable agreement between free and equal citizens, dramatised by a thought experiment-the original position-which asks each of us what political regime she would choose to live under if she knew neither which of its roles she filled, nor her own answers to the deepest moral, political, social, and religious questions.
The shared core is what it is fair to require of one another despite our deep differences-that is, what would be chosen under these conditions of fair choice.
2. We must remain neutral, in the public or political sphere, about our comprehensive conceptions of the good: we must choose not to enforce our answers to the deepest questions. However, Rawls does not intend to imply scepticism about those answers. We are fully to hold and assert the truth of what we believe in private.
3. Anyone gets in who can limit their public discourse, and their arguments about the use of state power, according to the ideal of reasonableness. In Rawls's own U.S. context, for instance, premillenial dispensationalist
Christians get in, just so long as they make no appeal to The Revelation of St.
John the Divine when trying to direct public power-because they cannot reasonably expect other citizens to accept such arguments. Either there are cases where we must enforce despite a lack of warrant to do so, and the proposed justification of toleration fails to show that our deepest moral, social and religious claims are not among those cases; or enforcement always requires warrant, and toleration is no more warranted, nor therefore enforceable, than any other social and political practice.
Either way, sceptical toleration is self-defeating. The pragmatic justification of toleration, on the other hand, doesn't do enough. It offers at best a modus vivendi justification, that mutual toleration is the least worst option in current circumstances.
In different circumstances-a less equal balance of power between competing confessions; better technologies of surveillance and control-intolerance might be the better bet. We wanted more out of a justification of toleration than the mere thought that, right now, no-one can safely get away with intolerance. I conclude that Hume's explicit justification of toleration needs, at least, to be supplemented. In what follows, I shall emphasise the contrast Sextus draws here between holding opinions and being subject to guidance and necessitation by nature and feeling.
How is this relevant to Dialogues? The character Philo can be understood as a
Pyrrhonist. In Dialogues part 1 he initially appears to be a Cartesian sceptic, denying that there is any rational warrant for any belief whatsoever (actually being introduced to such a person would be rather like being introduced to Hamlet). Cleanthes makes the obvious objection to this position as a way of life:
Whether your skepticism be as absolute and sincere as you pretend, we shall learn by and by, when the company breaks up; we shall then see whether you go out at the door or the window, and whether you really doubt if your body has gravity or can be injured by its fall, according to popular opinion derived from our fallacious senses and more fallacious experience. To whatever length anyone may push his speculative principles of skepticism, he must act, I own, and live, and converse like other men; and for this conduct he is not obliged to give any other reason than the absolute necessity he lies under of so doing.
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One way of reading this retreat is that Philo is advocating Hume's own mitigated or Academic scepticism
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. But I want to focus, instead, on the echo of Sextus: we must live, and act, and converse; we are not able to be utterly inactive. On this reading, Philo is drawing the reader's attention to the immediate and inescapable demands of human life-the guidance and necessitation of nature and feeling. Pyrrhonists, according to Sextus, are disturbed by things which are forced upon them; for we agree that at times they shiver and are thirsty and have other feelings of this kind.
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The Pyrrhonist does not hold opinions
16
; she is merely subject to certain demands.
The answer to Cleanthes's common-sense argument against Cartesian scepticism is that belief is not the only thing which shapes life; it is not even the most important thing. Life is shaped by the necessary demands of nature, even in the absence of opinions or beliefs. There is no rational warrant for acting as if one really is a vulnerable human in a recalcitrant world, but no such warrant is required. The answer 13 Op. cit. note 12, 6-7.
14 I want to thank Martin Bell for pressing me on this point. , 1999) . This last suggestion gains plausibility from some of Hume's private remarks about his own lack of religious practice. In a letter to James Edmonstoune, for instance, Hume drily regrets that he isn't able to bring himself to the harmless hypocrisy of playing along with religious observance: 'I wish it were still in my power to be a hypocrite in this particular. The common duties of society require it; and the ecclesiastical profession only adds a little more to an innocent dissimulation, or rather simulation, without which it is impossible to pass through the world. . True religion, then, is in practice indistinguishable from no religion. If it has any religious features, they are forms of words or public rituals, with which Philo is willing to play along for politeness's sake, but which are to have no influence on the communal use of power.
There is an echo here of the Epicurean position described above: public performance is distinguished from private belief, and the latter is to have no influence on the former. But in this version, it is Demea's belief in a God who makes knowable commands which is excluded, rather than Epicurus's disbelief.
The second point that Philo and Cleanthes agree on is the source of morality. For Demea, the source of morality is the authoritative command of God, as heard and interpreted, of course, by Demea. For Cleanthes and Philo, the source of morality is the demands we are subject to as humans. The source is nature, not command: we must live, act, and converse; we must suffer thirst and feel cold; we must make our way as vulnerable bodies who need each other; we cannot help but react to selfishness and benevolence, or to politeness and contempt, as we do; we can be educated to react 
Nature as Justification
I said at the start of this paper that I aimed both at interpretation and at archaeology. I now move to the second of those aims, and try to show that the theory of toleration I have discovered in Hume is an attractive alternative to contemporary Rawlsian theory.
Of my three taxonomic questions about the justification, the inclusions and the exclusions of a regime of toleration, the first is fundamental, and I concentrate on it here. I shall set out Rawls's strategy for justification, contrast it with Hume's naturalistic alternative, and consider some advantages and possible disadvantages of the latter. I intend only to make the contrast between Hume and Rawls clearer, and to offer some considerations which might tend to make us choose Hume of the two, not to refute Rawls.
A justification of some proposition or action is a decisive reason for believing that proposition or performing that action. The practice of justification, then, is concerned with discovering and conveying reasons, and showing that they outweigh or trump conflicting reasons. The distinction between Hume's and Rawls's accounts of the justification of toleration is a distinction between the kinds of reasons they take to be decisive for what we ought to believe and/or do about toleration.
Rawls's account of the justification of a moral or political regime changed over his career, in ways too complex to describe here. What became increasingly clear over the course of those changes, however, was that Rawls saw justification as an activity internal to a system of beliefs. Rawls's decisive reason for endorsing beliefs about toleration is consistency: denying those beliefs is inconsistent with beliefs about the freedom and equality of citizens; these beliefs about citizens are so central to our political culture that we cannot or will not give them up. The immediate practical task of political philosophy is to discover in our culture a basis for public agreement on first principles of justice, and those principles will embody toleration by being neutral between competing religious and secular conceptions of the good. We justify toleration by showing that our shared core of belief in the free and equal citizen requires us to leave space for difference over our answers to deep questions about value, and to refrain from enforcing our own answers to those questions.
Rawls's constructivist approach to the justificatory task is to give accounts of (1) the liberal-democratic concept of the citizen as free, equal, and possessing moral powers;
(2) the well-ordered society; and (3) the original position. Rawls then moves from (1) to (2) Humans need food and shelter in the sense that we will suffer the serious harms of starvation and exposure without them. Humans also need the company and conversation of other humans in this sense: without them, we suffer serious developmental and psychological harms. Vulnerabilities are those characteristics of humans which entail that we have needs. They are the specific ways in which we can suffer harm, including the various ways in which our bodies can be damaged, our personalities deranged, and our relationships with others rendered intolerable. We are vulnerable to being cut, broken, maddened, and enslaved. As the last possibility suggests, some of our most important vulnerabilities are to one another: some of the For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill to strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself.
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No matter what small advantages you enjoy over other humans, they can always gang up on you, and they know where you sleep. These remarks about human needs and vulnerabilities are, in a sense, banal; they have to be insisted on only in the context of a contemporary Rawlsian paradigm which understands justification as an appeal to the internal consistency of political belief-systems.
We are now in a position to compare the Humean with the Rawlsian account of the justification of toleration. I want to emphasise two advantages of Hume, before considering one possible disadvantage. Hume's first advantage is that the Humean strategy for justifying toleration has far wider scope than the Rawlsian. Rawls's account of justification is particularistic or anti-universalist: we start from where we are, embedded in a particular political culture, and do not attempt to extend its values to all times and places. In Rawls's later work it became increasingly clear that 'we' are the heirs of a liberal-democratic constitutional tradition-perhaps, even, just that tradition in the United States-and no-one else:
We look to ourselves and to our future, and reflect upon our disputes since, let's say, the Declaration of Independence. How far the conclusions we reach are of interest in a wider context is a separate question. allowed Rawls to show that commitment to the liberal ideal of the citizen entails commitment to toleration, then to compete, the Humean would have to offer some similar derivation, and that looks unlikely. But Rawls is explicit that he cannot show such an entailment: the original position allows us to make a reasonable choice between some major alternatives in the history of moral and political thought, not to derive the principles of justice from the ideal of the citizen
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. So, the Humean is not in a worse position: she also can appeal to history, and especially to the history of tolerant and intolerant regimes, to argue for the superiority of the former in relation to human needs and vulnerabilities. She does not need to derive an account of a particular regime solely from those needs and vulnerabilities.
A great deal more could be said in defence of Rawls and the Rawlsian strategy. I have not tried to refute Rawls, but only intend, as noted above, to offer some considerations which might incline us to the Humean naturalistic rather than the Rawlsian mode of justification.
44 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (revised edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), section 21.
Conclusion
On my reading, Dialogues dramatises a tolerant political practice grounded in shared human necessity, not in belief, and especially not in belief in God. On this Humean account, toleration is justified not by the discovery of esoteric truths about the character and commands of God, nor by the working out of our commitments as liberal citizens, but by the immediate demands of human life. Not belief but the world, because belief is not the only or even the most important thing which shapes human life: needs and vulnerabilities are prior. As I have read him, Hume is dramatising the requirements of a shared life which is neither a theocracy nor a war, and which allows its members to live, and act, and converse as they need.
I end by explaining my title, 'No Abiding City'. This is a near-quote from Philo, describing the advantages of the sceptic in debate:
How complete must be his victory who remains always, with all mankind, on the offensive, and has himself no fixed station or abiding city which he is ever, on any occasion, obliged to defend?
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I have reread Dialogues as dramatising an attractive way of defending an abiding city, grounded in human necessity, not in belief.
